Foreword: Do We Really Want to Know the Defendant? by Nance, Dale A.
Case Western Reserve University 
School of Law Scholarly Commons 
Faculty Publications 
1994 
Foreword: Do We Really Want to Know the Defendant? 
Dale A. Nance 
Case Western University School of Law, dale.nance@case.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/faculty_publications 
 Part of the Evidence Commons 
Repository Citation 
Nance, Dale A., "Foreword: Do We Really Want to Know the Defendant?" (1994). Faculty Publications. 382. 
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/faculty_publications/382 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Case 
Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. 
I' 
FOREWORD: DO WE REALLY WANT 
TO KNOW THE DEFENDANT? 
DALE A. NANCE* 
The philosopher David Burne may have been right that we can-
not logically infer anything about the future from the past.l Yet the 
common sense of the matter is otherwise. And most scientists, not 
known for naivete in matters of inference, would readily concede that 
the best indicator of the future is the pattern of the past. Indeed, in 
some sense it is the only indicator. In terms of human behavior, this 
compelling intuition is reflected in the fact that we commonly speak of 
a person's traits of character, ideas that are inevitably based on the 
person's patterns of past behavior and which are used in turn to antici-
pate future conduct. Put in the context of the allegation of a crime or 
other serious wrongdoing, the common sense of the matter - and the 
scientists' working postulate- suggests that one of the best indicators 
of the likelihood that the defendant committed the alleged act is the 
person's history of similar misconduct.2 
THE RULES GOVERNING OTHER MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE 
It is not surprising, therefore, that one of the most controversial 
aspects of modern Anglo-American evidence law is the rule, or set of 
rules, that generally prohibits the use of evidence of a person's charac-
ter to make inferences about the probability that the person has com-
mitted a breach of duty.3 To the uninitiated, this rule sounds absurd 
on its face. And indeed, the law on the subject reflects the tension 
between the rationales that have been given for the rules and the ordi-
nary understanding of the way we act on our knowledge of someone's 
* Professor of Law and Norman & Edna Freehling Scholar, Chicago-Kent College of 
Law, Illinois Institute of Technology. 
1. Philosophers continue to wrestle with the problem, which is known in the literature 
simply as "the problem of induction." 1\vo classics of the modern literature are NELSON Gooo. 
MAN, FAcr, FICTION, AND FORECAST (3d ed. 1979), and A.J. AYER, PROBABIUTY AND Evr. 
DENCE (1972). For simplicity, I have referred to projections of future events. The philosophical 
dilemma applies not only to projections about future events, but also to projections about un-
known past events from other known past events, a context obviously more common in litigation 
settings. Inferences at trial are still inductive in character. See generally 1A JoHN H. WIGMORE, 
EVIDENCE § 30 (Tillers' rev. 1983). 
2. See 1A WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 55. Cf id. § 64 (in many civil controversies, character 
traits are largely irrelevant). 
3. See generally McCoRMicK ON EVIDENCE§ 188 (4th ed. 1992). 
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propensities. Numerous exceptions to, and circumventions of, the 
prohibition have been developed,4 and applied in ways that reflect in 
part the less than complete confidence we have in the rationales 
themselves.s 
One of the most important stress points in this history has been 
the problem of sexual violence. So compelling has been the belief in 
character propensities, when it comes to sexual inclinations, that the 
common law routinely, if somewhat fitfully, has allowed evidence of 
traits of sexual perversion to show that the defendant engaged in the 
alleged sexual misconduct. Though sometimes explained as not vio-
lating the prohibition of propensity based inferences, more candid 
opinions, as well as academic commentary, have recognized thecate-
gory as genuinely exceptional. 6 
TI1is exception was apparently rejected in the adoption of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975. Those rules, since used as the ba-
sis for codification in most states, provide for the usual list of excep-
tions to the prohibition, but do not endorse the idea that sexual 
violence is exceptional. The governing provision is Rule 404, which 
now states: 
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character 
or a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving 
action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except: 
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of char-
acter offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the 
same; 
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of charac-
ter of the victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prose-
cution to rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of 
peacefulness of the victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide 
case to rebut evidence that the victim was the first aggressor; 
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a wit-
ness, as provided in Rules 607, 608, and 609. 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, 
or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order 
to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admis-
sible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, in-
tent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake 
or accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecu-
tion in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of 
trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good 
4. Id. §§ 189-195. 
5. Those rationales are briefly outlined infra at notes 21-25 and accompanying text. 
6. See IA WIGMORE, supra note 1, §§ 62.2, 62.3. 
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cause shown, of the general nature of any such evidence it intends 
to introduce at trial. 
5 
Though not without serious ambiguities, nowhere does this rule sug-
gest any difference between the treatment of sexual misconduct cases 
and other classes of cases. And some of the appellate case law since 
adoption of the Rules seems to be taking this omission seriously, elim-
inating the common-law exception.7 
The resulting exclusionary rule has come under attack in the 
wake of several highly publicized cases, and in a context of increasing 
concern about sexual violence against women and children. With the 
encouragement of the Department of Justice, Congress recently acted 
to address these concerns. In the crime bill passed last August, Con-
gress added three new rules to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
designed to restore and articulate the common-law exception. Section 
320935 of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 
1994,8 entitled "Admissibility of Evidence of Similar Crimes in Sex 
Offense Cases," provides: 
(a) The Federal Rules of Evidence are amended by adding after 
Rule 412 the following new rules: 
"Rules 413. Evidence of Similar Crimes in Sexual Assault Cases 
"(a) In a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of an 
offense of sexual assault, evidence of the defendant's commission of 
another offense or offenses of sexual assault is admissible, and may 
be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant. 
"(b) In a case in which the Government intends to offer evi-
dence under this rule, the attorney for the Government shall dis-
close the evidence to the defendant, including statements of 
witnesses or a summary of the substance of any testimony that is 
expected to be offered, at least fifteen days before the scheduled 
date of trial or at such later time as the court may allow for good 
cause. 
"(c) This rule shall not be construed to limit the admission or 
consideration of evidence under any other rule. 
"(d) For purposes of this rule and Rule 415, "offense of sexual 
assault" means a crime under Federal law or the law of a State (as 
7. See, e.g., Getz v. State, 538 A.2d 726 (Del. 1988); State v. Zybach, 761 P.2d 1334 (Or. Ct. 
App. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 775 P.2d 318 (Or. 1989). To be sure, other courts have not 
found the omission to be so determinative. See, e.g., State v. Day, 715 P.2d 743, 747 (Ariz. 1986); 
State v. Charles L, 398 S.E.2d 123, 131-33 (W.Va. 1990). States that have not formally adopted 
the Federal Rules may have been affected by them nonetheless, as some have since rejected the 
exception in question by decisional law. See, e.g., Lannan v. State, 600 N.E.2d 1334 (Ind. 1992); 
Pendleton v. Commonwealth, 685 S.W.2d 549 (Ky. 1985). The continuing controversy over the 
issue is reflected in occasional legislative intervention. See, e.g., INn. ConE ANN. § 35-37-4-15 
(1994) (overruling Lannon); Mo. REv. STAT. § 566.025 (1994) (inclusionary rule for child 
molestation). 
8. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (Sept. 13, 1994). 
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defined in section 513 of title 18, United States Code) that in-
volved-
"(1) any conduct proscribed by chapter 109A of title 18, United 
States Code; 
"(2) contact, without consent, between any part of the defend-
ant's body or an object and the genitals or anus of another person; 
"(3) contact, without consent, between the genitals or anus of 
the defendant and any part of another person's body; 
"(4) deriving sexual pleasure or gratification from the infliction 
of death, bodily injury, or physical pain on another person; or 
"(5) an attempt or. conspiracy to engage in conduct described in 
paragraph (1)-( 4). 
"Rule 414. Evidence of Similar Crimes in Child Molestation Cases 
"(a) In a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of an 
offense of child molestation, evidence of the defendant's commis-
sion of another offense or offenses of child molestation is admissi-
ble, and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it 
is relevant. 
"(b) In a case in which the Government intends to offer evi-
dence under this rule, the attorney for the Government shall dis-
close the evidence to the defendant, including statements of 
witnesses or a summary of the substance of any testimony that is 
expected to be offered, at least fifteen days before the scheduled 
date of trial or at such later time as the court may allow for good 
cause. 
"(c) This rule shall not be construed to limit the admission or 
consideration of evidence under any other rule. 
"(d) For purposes of this rule and Rule 415, "child" means a 
person below the age of fourteen, and "offense of child molesta-
tion" means a crime under Federal law or the law of a State (as 
defined in section 513 of title 18, United States Code) that in-
volved-
"(1) any conduct proscribed by chapter 109A of title 18, United 
States Code, that was committed in relation to a child; 
"(2) any conduct proscribed by chapter 110 of title 18, United 
States Code; 
"(3) contact between any part of the defendant's body or an 
object of the genitals or anus of a child; 
"(4) contact between the genitals or anus of the defendant and 
any part of the body of a child; 
"(5) deriving sexual pleasure or gratification from the infliction 
of death, bodily injury, or physical pain on a child; or 
"(6) an attempt or conspiracy to engage in conduct described in 
paragraphs (1)-(5). 
"Rule 415. Evidence of Similar Acts in Civil Cases Concerning Sex-
ual Assault or Child Molestation 
"(a) In a civil case in which a claim for damages or other relief 
is predicated on a party's alleged commission of conduct constitut-
1994] FOREWORD 
ing an offense of sexual assault or child molestation, evidence of 
that party's commission or another offense or offenses of sexual as-
sault or child molestation is admissible and may be considered as 
provided in Rule 413 and Rule 414 of these rules. 
"(b) A party who intends to offer evidence under this Rule 
shall disclose the evidence to the party against whom it will be of-
fered, including statements of witnesses or a summary of the sub-
stance of any testimony that is expected to be offered, at least 
fifteen days before the scheduled date of trial or at such later time 
as the court may allow for good cause. 
"(c) This rule shall not be construed to limit the admission or 
consideration of evidence under any other rule." 
(b) IMPLEMENTATION.-The amendments made by subsection (a) 
shall become effective pursuant to subsection (d). 
(c) REcoMMENDATIONs BY JuDICIAL CoNFERENCE.-Not later 
than 150 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Judicial 
Conference of the United States shall transmit to Congress a report 
containing recommendations for amending the Federal Rules of Ev-
idence as they affect the admission of evidence of a defendant's 
prior sexual assault or child molestation crimes in cases involving 
sexual assault and child molestation. The Rules Enabling Act shall 
not apply to the recommendations made by the Judicial Conference 
pursuant to this section. 
(d) CoNGRESSIONAL ACTioN.-
(1) If the recommendations described in subsection (c) are the 
same as the amendments made by subsection (a) then the amend-
ments made by subsection (a) shall become effective 30 days after 
the transmittal of the recommendations. 
(2) If the recommendations described in subsection (c) are dif-
ferent than the amendments made by subsection (a), the amend-
ments made by subsection (a) shall become effective 150 days after 
the transmittal of the recommendations unless otherwise provided 
by law. 
(3) If the Judicial Conference fails to comply with subsection 
(c), the amendments made by subsection (a) shall become effective 
150 days after the date the recommendations were due under sub-
section (c) unless otherwise provided by law. 
(e) APPLICATION.-The amendments made by subsection (a) shall 
apply to proceedings commenced on or after the effective date of 
such amendments. 
7 
Several points are worth noting. First, the new rules confirm the 
common-law exception only with respect to prior acts constituting an 
"offense," a defined term; other forms of evidence of character, such 
as the defendant's reputation or the opinions of others with regard to 
his character, remain subject to the Rule 404 exclusion. Second, the 
new rules cover only sexual assault and sexual molestation of children 
under the age of 14 years, thus leaving prosecutions for criminal acts 
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between consenting adults to be governed by the pre-existing system 
of rules. Third, the new rules allow the admission of "prior act" char-
acter evidence in both criminal and civil cases.9 And fourth, the effec-
tive date for the new rules is delayed for up to 300 days in order to 
obtain and evaluate a report of the Judicial Conference on the issue. 
THE SYMPOSIUM pAPERS 
This Symposium consists of four, relatively short papers. Its gen-
esis indicates its justification. In 1992, while an earlier effort to enact 
this legislation was working its way through Congress, I was elected 
Chair of the Evidence Section of the Association of A_merican Law 
Schools. In that capacity, I asked David Karp, principal drafter of the 
new rules on behalf of the Department of Justice, to speak to the Evi-
dence Section at the annual meeting of the Association in January 
1993. The paper then presented by Mr. Karp is reproduced here for 
its value in considering the new rules.l0 That value is considerably 
heightened by the fact that the principal legislative sponsors of the 
new rules, Senator Robert Dole and Representative Susan Molinari, 
subsequently referred to Mr. Karp's address as "a detailed account of 
the views of the legislative sponsors and the Administration concern-
ing the proposed reform," which "should also be considered an au-
thoritative part of its legislative history."11 
Also presented here is the response that was invited from.Profes-
sor Edward Imwinkelried, of the University of California, Davis. Pro-
fessor Imwinkelried is the author of numerous articles and a thorough 
treatise on the subject of "other misconduct" evidence.U He argues 
that the new rules go too far toward one extreme, failing to give ade-
quate weight to the legitimate interests of the defendant.13 The third 
9. Similarly, the crime bill also extended to civil cases the "rape shield" rule, protecting 
alleged victims of sexual misconduct from the admission of evidence of the victim's prior sexual 
conduct or predisposition. See id. § 40141. 
10. See David J. Karp, Evidence of Propensity and Probability in Sex Offense Cases and 
Other Cases, 70 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 15 (1994). 
11. Floor Statement of Principal Senate Sponsor, Senator Robert Dole, concerning Prior 
Crimes Evidence Rule for Sexual Assault and Child Molestation Cases, 140 CoNG. REc. 
S12,990 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1994) [hereinafter Statement of Sen. Dole]; Floor Statement of Prin-
cipal House Sponsor, Representative Susan Molinari, concerning Prior Crimes Evidence Rules 
for Sexual Assault and Child Molestation Cases, 140 CoNG. REc. H8991-92 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 
1994) [hereinafter Statement of Rep. Molinari]. 
12. See EDWARD J. lMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MJscONDUcr EVIDENCE (1984). 
13. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, Some Comments about Mr. David Karp's Remarks on Pro-
pensity Evidence, 70 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 37 (1994). 
3 
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piece is a brief reply by Mr. Karp, as befitted the circumstances.14 Ex-
cept as indicated, the three articles are reproduced here essentially in 
the form originally presented, without taking into account subsequent 
thoughts or events. · 
As the reader will discover, Professor Imwinkelried's discussion 
of the new rules is informed by his study of the evolution of English 
rules dealing with character propensity evidence. The comparative fo-
cus suggested a further extension, addressing the treatment of this 
kind of evidence in continental European jurisprudence. Interest-
ingly, there turns out to be very little written on the continental treat-
ment of uncharged misconduct evidence generally, much less on the 
narrower category of sexual misconduct evidence. Consequently, I in-
vited Mirjan Damaska, Professor of Law at Yale University, to pro-
vide some insight on this point. Unfortunately, competing 
commitments precluded his attendance at the AALS meeting, but 
Professor Damaska graciously agreed to provide written comments to 
supplement the presentations made by Mr. Karp and Professor Im-
winkelried. Thus, the fourth piece in this Symposium is Professor 
Damaska's paper, it! which he explains the much greater exposure of 
continental judges to character and propensity evidence.15 
PRELIMINARY COMMENTS ON THE MERITS OF THE NEW RULES 
Even a casual reading of the new rules suggests a host of ques-
tions about their interpretation. For example, the rules are phrased so 
that the described evidence "is admissible, and may be considered for 
its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant." The rules do not say 
simply that such evidence is excepted from the propensity ban of Rule 
404. That seems to imply that the evidence may not be excluded for 
any reason except perhaps irrelevance,16 which would, in particular, 
preclude exclusion under Rule 403, the rule allowing discretionary ex-
clusion of excessively prejudicial or cumulative evidenceP However, 
according to their supporters, the new rules are not to be read this 
14. David J. Karp, Response to Professor Imwinkelried's Comments, 70 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 
49 (1994). 
15. Mirjan R. Damaska, Propensity Evidence in Continental Legal Systems, 70 Cm.-KENT L. 
REv. 55 (1994). 
16. Actually, the rule says that such evidence is admissible even if it is completely irrele-
vant, although it also implies, for example, that a judge could instruct the jury not to consider 
such evidence for any purpose once it is admitted. That, of course, would be quite silly; if it may 
not be used for any purpose, it certainly should be excluded, though the rule does not permit this 
as worded. 
17. That rule provides: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value 
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or mislead-
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way. "Admissible" is to be read as "may be admitted," not "must be 
admitted," so that exclusion under Rule 403 or on other grounds re-
mains a possibility.18 
This, however, is contrary to the usual understanding of the term 
"admissible." Ordinarily, when a judge or trial lawyer says evidence is 
"admissible," she means that a judge may not refuse admission. For 
example, when Rule 402 says that relevant evidence "is admissible, 
except as otherwise provided," it does not mean that the trial judge 
may admit relevant evidence not otherwise excluded by some rule, but 
rather that the trial judge must admit such evidence. And when a 
judge has discretion under Rule 403 to admit a given piece of evi-
dence, depending upon the balance of probative value and prejudicial 
potential, we do not say that evidence is "admissible" because of the 
existence of discretion, even though it may or may not be admitted. 
Rather, we say that it is admissible or inadmissible as a conclusion 
after the indicated balance between probative value and prejudice has 
been determined. Until that judgment is made, and indeed until all 
other necessary judgments about the applicability of admissibility 
rules have been made, the evidence cannot be said to be either admis-
sible or inadmissible.19 Given the stated goals of the drafters, the new 
rules should be worded simply as exceptions to the propensity prohi-
bition in Rule 404(b po 
Presumably, this kind of problem will be handled by the Judicial 
Conference in its consideration of the new rules. Our concern here is 
less technical. The essential question is whether such an exception for 
sexual assaults should be incorporated in the rules, assuming that the 
ing the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence." FED. R. EVID. 403. 
18. Karp, supra note 10, at 19 ("these rules are rules of admissibility, and not mandatory 
rules of admission"). This point is reiterated by Senator Dole, see Statement of Sen. Dole, supra 
note 11, and Represenative Molinari. See Statement of Rep. Molinair, supra note 11. 
19. There is, of course, a sense in which the word "admissible" denotes permissiveness, but 
that is because there is more than one person involved. When we say evidence is admissible, we 
do not mean that it must be placed in evidence, only that it must be admitted (by the judge) if it 
is offered (by an appropriate party). There is a choice here, but it is that of the offering party, 
not the judge. 
20. It must be acknowledged that the Federal Rules of Evidence are not entirely clear or 
consistent in their mode of expression, but those contexts in which the "is admissible" locution 
does not denote a mandatory admission more obviously represent only exceptions to designated 
exclusionary rules. See, e.g., FED. R. Evm. 1004 (exceptions to original document rule; secon-
dary evidence said to be "admissible"). Even here, it would be better if the confusion were 
avoided. Similar, but more serious, problems can be found elsewhere. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 
609(a) (evidence of conviction of crime "shall be admitted" under certain circumstances, sug-
gesting the ridiculous result that hearsay evidence of criminal conviction satisfying Rule 609 
requirements cannot be excluded under Rule 802). 
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exception can be appropriately worded. This requires us to examine 
the rationales of the usual prohibition, instantiated by Rule 404, and 
the extent to which the special context of sexual assault presents pos-
sibilities for defeating those rationales. Fortunately, the rationales of 
the general exclusion, and the question of their application to sexual 
assault cases, are taken up directly in the papers that follow. For pres-
ent purposes, I want only to point out that the arguments fall into 
three broad categories.z1 
First, and most commonly, there are arguments based on the dan-
ger of other misconduct evidence to the truth-finding function of the 
tribunal. These arguments come in two analytically distinct forms: 
those concerning th~ probatively misleading nature of character trait 
evidence, and those concerning the potential for prejudice against the 
defendant because of the trier's hostile reaction to other misconduct. 
The former address the possibility that the trier will inaccurately as-
sess the probability that the defendant committed the charged offense, 
whereas the latter address the possibility that the trier will not apply 
the correct standard of proof to the probability it determines, even if it 
.determines it accurately.zz 
Second, there are arguments based on the distraction and waste 
of time that is inherent in disputing the claims of other misconduct. 
This is distinct from the first category because it does not depend 
upon the notion that an additional risk of inaccuracy is thereby in-
jected into the present proceeding. Even if any unwarranted preju-
dice against the defendant, and any misleading inferences from the 
uncharged acts, can be eliminated, the net result is to spend much 
time considering matters that may be of little probative value to the 
present case.23 
21. For an excellent yet brief account, see RICHARD 0. LEMPERT & STEPHEN A. 
SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 216-19 (2d ed. 1982). 
22. Addressing the former argument raises in tum two distinguishable empirical issues, one 
having to do with recidivism rates, psychological theories of character traits, and other indicia of 
the probative value of the misconduct evidence, the other having to do with the predictability of 
jury misuse of the misconduct evidence. It is, after all, one thing to say that social scientists 
overestimate the value of character evidence, quite another to say that lay jurors do. Professor 
Imwinkelried seems to conflate these issues in his discussion. See Imwinkelried, supra note 13, 
at 43-46. 
23. The argument, often encountered, that raising the issue of uncharged misconduct might 
"unfairly surprise" the defendant at trial may be either an argument about wasting resources of 
the tribunal and the parties, as the defendant takes appropriate steps to meet the issue, or as an 
argument about induced inaccuracy, assuming the defendant is unable to present appropriate 
and extant counter evidence in the limited time available at trial. It will be noticed that the latter 
concern is addressed in section (b) of each of the new rules by a requirement of notice to the 
defendant. 
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Third, there are arguments based on the liberal premise that once 
a person has been prosecuted for a crime, and punished if the result is 
a judgment of guilty, he has "paid his debt to society" and should not 
be plagued further by the history of the offense. This kind of argu-
ment, though occasionally articulated,24 is decidedly weak, since it 
begs the question of what the punishment is to be. It is entirely plausi-
ble to say that various adverse consequences, beside formal punish-
ment by the state, attach to conviction of crime, including exclusion 
from certain professions, loss of the right to carry weapons, and so on. 
Similar, though less serious, consequences may attach to mere suspi-
cion of crime. One of these consequences may well be that the police 
are likely to use one's criminal history, including mere allegations of 
wrongdoing, as the basis for shaping their search for the culprit. And 
it is arguable that the same reasoning should permit the trier of fact to 
use such information without violating some political right of the 
defendant.25 
In the papers that follow, one should attend to the nature of the 
arguments presented with regard to sexual assault and attempt to un-
derstand them in terms of some such taxonomy of arguments. That 
may prove difficult at times, but the struggle to understand the argu-
ments in these terms can be illuminating. To take one example, run-
ning through Mr. Karp's arguments is a theme to the effect that there 
is a special need for evidence of prior sexual assaults. One should be 
especially careful about such arguments. They can mean at least two 
different things. 
On the one hand, they can mean that there is a special need to 
suppress sexual assault. Before that can be accepted as an argument 
for admitting evidence, one must answer the question of why the best 
way to suppress a given type of crime is by making it easier to convict 
that class of defendants, as opposed, for example, to stiffening penal-
ties or otherwise encouraging prosecutions. Unless the social need ar-
gument is tied in some way to countering one or more of the three 
types of arguments for exclusion articulated above, it may be morally 
equivalent to an argument that the burden of proof for conviction 
24. See LEMPERT & SALTZBURG, supra note 21, at 219. 
25. Of course, using the information in this way, in view of the fact that the police will have 
also so used it, may pose a danger to accuracy by virtue of a kind of double counting. See id. at 
217-18 (suggesting reasons that criminal record may be given too much weight unless effects of 
plea bargaining are taken into account). But this is a different type of argument, aimed at the 
question of the balance between probative value and potential to mislead. 
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should be lowered for allegations of sexual violence.26 This conclu-
sion might be circumvented to the extent that the general rationale for 
exclusion is thought to be avoiding the waste of resources rather than 
avoiding risks of inaccuracy, since one can then argue that even a 
small probative value in the evidence of prior offenses is worth the 
expense and effort of consideration.27 
On the other hand, the argument from special need can be aimed 
at the peculiar epistemic features of the cases under consideration. 
Mr. Karp's argument seems focused primarily in this direction, as he 
addresses the special problems of the availability of probative evi-
dence that occur in many sexual assaults and child molestation cases. 
But even here, we must press ourselves to answer why it is that the 
weakness of other available evidence is a reason to admit evidence 
that would otherwise be considered too prejudicial or misleading. 
Does the paucity of other evidence somehow make propensity evi-
dence less prejudicial, less misleading? If anything, one would expect 
the opposite relation, since the trier will be forced to dwell all the 
more upon the alleged prior offenses. But again, one way to avoid 
this conclusion would be to see the special need argument as linked to 
the proposition that the general exclusionary rule is based on effi-
ciency concerns.2s 
These considerations point to a more general problem. If the law 
is to have integrity, the proposal to exempt other misconduct evidence 
in sexual offense cases must assume that the rationales· of the general 
exclusion are correct, at least in the sense of justifying on balance the 
prohibition of other misconduct evidence when used to set up a pro-
26. This could be articulated as a call for either lowering the standard of proof to some level 
below the usual, and still constitutionally mandated, "beyond reasonable doubt" standard, or-
more subtly-for modifying the usual meaning of "reasonable" in that standard. For a discus-
sion of the ultimate source of the constitutional guarantee, see Dale A. Nance, Civility and the 
Burden of Proof, 17 HARv. J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 647 (1994). 
27. In the last part of Mr. Karp's address, he relies on the history of the general prohibition 
to argue, seemingly, that it has less to do with avoiding prejudice than with avoiding unfair 
surprise and unnecessarily protracted trials. See Karp, supra note 10, at 27-30. 
28. Of course, the matter is different if the "other evidence," though available, is not 
presented to the trier of fact. Another way to avoid the dilemma indicated in the text would be 
to see the exclusionary rule as designed, at least in part, to induce prosecutors to develop and 
present more particular evidence about the charged crime, and not to rely on the trier of fact to 
convict simply because of the defendant's criminal history. Such an argument has been used in 
support of the suggestion of an inclusionary exception limited to acquaintance rapes, in the con-
text of which prior offense evidence is claimed to be both more probative and less prejudicial 
than in other types of cases. See David P. Bryden & Roger C. Park, "Other Crimes" Evidence in 
Sex Offense Cases, 78 MINN. L. REv. 529, 575-82 (1994). It is thought that in such cases, there 
may be no need to try to induce the presentation of better evidence by an exclusionary rule, 
because commonly none will exist. /d. at 578-79. 
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pensity inference; otherwise, the proper response is to repeal the pro-
hibition entirely. Of course, it is quite plausible to see the new rules 
as reflecting a political alliance between anti-crime political forces, 
favoring total repeal of Rule 404 (or at least of 404(b)), and political 
forces we might call interest group feminist, concerned only (or pri-
marily) with crime as it adversely affects women and their children. 
But such a compromise does not generate a law consistent in principle 
unless a reasonable theoretical difference can explain the resulting 
distinction between sexual violence and other serious crime, such as 
clandestine murder, where the social need and paucity of evidence 
factors are also in play.29 
In the final analysis, it may be that the new rules are simply in-
consistent in underlying principle with the general prohibition. Even 
so, it is still possible to argue for the new rules as a kind of experi-
ment. That is, liberalized admissibility for a politically accessible cate-
gory of cases may be found, in the wake of experience, to be a 
workable and satisfactory arrangement. That would make it easier at 
a still later date to repeal, or substantially water down, the whole pro-
pensity inference prohibition. This may be a laudable goal, one Euro-
pean jurisdictions have largely achieved already. However, on the 
assumption of incoherence in principle, it is not obvious that alleged 
sexual offenders, however unsympathetic they may be, have no plausi-
ble complaint about unequal treatment.30 On the other hand, perhaps 
it is pointless to look for a principled scheme here. The pre-existing 
scheme, at least as it has been applied, may already be so arbitrary 
and incoherent that the addition of the sexual propensity exception 
will have little impact on the integrity of the system as a whole.31 
29. I do not mean to say that proponents of the new rule are being inconsistent unless they 
also believe that the general prohibition is justified in cases not covered by these cir other excep-
tions. They can consistently believe that the general prohibition is unjustifiable, but that the 
prohibition as applied to sexual assaults is even less justifiable. The problem here is not with 
hypocrisy within the contending factions, but with the implications of different kinds of political 
compromise. See Bryden & Park, supra note 28, at 572-75 (criticizing the inconsistency of a 
sexual assault exception). See generally RoNALD DwoRKrN, LAw's EMPIRE 176-84 (1986) 
(describing integrity of underlying principle as an account of the basic mandate to "treat like 
cases alike," and differentiating between compromises that do and those that do not preserve the 
integrity of the resulting scheme of law). 
30. Cf Dworkin, supra note 29, at 185-86 (contrasting inconsistency among discrete juris-
dictions, as among states in a federal system, with inconsistency within a particular jurisdiction's 
laws). 
31. See 1A WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 54.1 (lamenting the hypocrisy and unprincipled na-
ture of the compromises represented by the character evidence rules). 
